Both parties, when in the majority, follow a version of the Hastert Rule (a bill only makes it to the floor if supported by a majority of the majority), which guarantees that many bills which might be supported by a majority of representatives are never considered. Eliminating that rule would be a step in the direction you suggest. But, as you say, that requires a willingness by entrenched leaders to relinquish control.
This is excellent structural analysis. You've identified the core design flaw: a two-party system where the most extreme half of either party can veto everything, creating a tug-of-war that nobody wins.
What makes this proposal so compelling is that it doesn't require constitutional amendments, court rulings, or hoping politicians become better people. It just requires recognizing that the current incentive structure isn't working - and that party leadership has the authority to change it themselves.
More of this kind of systems-level thinking, please.
The pre 1995 caucus system in Congress was formidable--one of the reason's Newt Gingrich obliterated the ability of members to pool funding for shared staff. The Democratic Study Group had dozens of Republican members in its heyday. The Office of Technology Assessment provided over 100 scientists evaluating policy in the lawmaking workflow. Another way to democratize Congress would be to robustly staff caucuses so that members could meet, share information and create collegial identities outside of party. There is so much languishing in Congress--knowledge sharing, explaining, asking hard questions, hearing the voice of a diverse cross section of witnesses, connecting to the People. We set up dozens of task forces and caucuses just for the purpose of recognizing an issue as vital and of public importance. (especially on global public interests like nuclear security). I worked for a member who could organize any room in 5 minutes...Today's members are a paltry opposition because IMHO they are more activists than organizers--This is, I think due to social media. They are incentivized to perform, but not to govern. Still, revitalizing internal information sharing sorted and filtered by issue, not by party would do a lot of good and be a path in the right direction Thanks!
Except a majority of representative across party lines can vote to force a bill to the floor -- yet that almost never happens. Something "else" keeps enough of the minority of the majority party from siding with enough of the minority party to bring that about. The more of the majority party who want to pass the bill, the less of the minority party which need be willing to go along. The reverse is also true. The more of the minority party who want to pass the bill, the less of the majority party needed to go along.
The "something else" might be things like party support during reelection campaigns. The party throwing in behind the incumbent if s/he is a good party line adherent, versus the party throwing in behind a primary challenger is one the clubs party leadership uses. In heavily Gerrymandered, uncompetitive districts, it's also the primary election which ends up deciding who wins the general election.
Committee assignments also seem to be a club party leadership uses. Not sure how this one gets addressed unless one implements drawing from a hat to determine committee assignments. Presumably a "less than desirable" option given "hopefully" assignments also take into account competence. (Granted, that might be questioned in reality.)
It's interesting to note Republican Party Leadership tried to "primary" Murkowski and she ended up beating them. Leadership did manage to force a change in Republican candidate, but Murkowski beat that candidate in the General running as an Indie.
The key behind that was Alaska has ranked-choice voting. What happened was the Republican candidate got more votes than Murkowski in the first round, but the Democrat got less votes. So the Democrat was eliminated going into the second round, and Murkowski got most of the Democrat "second choice" (ranked choice) votes thus beating the Republican in the second round.
This is a good historical example of why ranked choice voting is a good idea. It creates pressure toward centrist candidates. Extremist candidates can come in first during the first round, but more moderate candidates who work to appeal across the aisle can pull votes from across the aisle in the later rounds.
In a strongly R district, the extremist R candidate has a likely chance of beating a moderate R in the Primary. That results in the extremist R very likely winning in the General.
In ranked choice, the extremist R would still get the majority of the R votes, but the moderate R who works to appeal across the aisle ends up getting D & I votes as D and I candidates get eliminated in the rounds. Or a moderate D candidate who works to appeal across the aisle could pull enough moderate R & I votes in later rounds to win.
This benefit of "working to appeal across the aisle" gives those politicians in power facing those types of elections leverage to convince their own parties that "ideological purity" will end up losing in the General. Rank choice voting also means party leadership cannot "primary" incumbents who don't demonstrate the leadership's idea of purity.
Both parties, when in the majority, follow a version of the Hastert Rule (a bill only makes it to the floor if supported by a majority of the majority), which guarantees that many bills which might be supported by a majority of representatives are never considered. Eliminating that rule would be a step in the direction you suggest. But, as you say, that requires a willingness by entrenched leaders to relinquish control.
This is excellent structural analysis. You've identified the core design flaw: a two-party system where the most extreme half of either party can veto everything, creating a tug-of-war that nobody wins.
What makes this proposal so compelling is that it doesn't require constitutional amendments, court rulings, or hoping politicians become better people. It just requires recognizing that the current incentive structure isn't working - and that party leadership has the authority to change it themselves.
More of this kind of systems-level thinking, please.
The pre 1995 caucus system in Congress was formidable--one of the reason's Newt Gingrich obliterated the ability of members to pool funding for shared staff. The Democratic Study Group had dozens of Republican members in its heyday. The Office of Technology Assessment provided over 100 scientists evaluating policy in the lawmaking workflow. Another way to democratize Congress would be to robustly staff caucuses so that members could meet, share information and create collegial identities outside of party. There is so much languishing in Congress--knowledge sharing, explaining, asking hard questions, hearing the voice of a diverse cross section of witnesses, connecting to the People. We set up dozens of task forces and caucuses just for the purpose of recognizing an issue as vital and of public importance. (especially on global public interests like nuclear security). I worked for a member who could organize any room in 5 minutes...Today's members are a paltry opposition because IMHO they are more activists than organizers--This is, I think due to social media. They are incentivized to perform, but not to govern. Still, revitalizing internal information sharing sorted and filtered by issue, not by party would do a lot of good and be a path in the right direction Thanks!
That’s a significant reason why congress is not as powerful as it should be
Except a majority of representative across party lines can vote to force a bill to the floor -- yet that almost never happens. Something "else" keeps enough of the minority of the majority party from siding with enough of the minority party to bring that about. The more of the majority party who want to pass the bill, the less of the minority party which need be willing to go along. The reverse is also true. The more of the minority party who want to pass the bill, the less of the majority party needed to go along.
The "something else" might be things like party support during reelection campaigns. The party throwing in behind the incumbent if s/he is a good party line adherent, versus the party throwing in behind a primary challenger is one the clubs party leadership uses. In heavily Gerrymandered, uncompetitive districts, it's also the primary election which ends up deciding who wins the general election.
Committee assignments also seem to be a club party leadership uses. Not sure how this one gets addressed unless one implements drawing from a hat to determine committee assignments. Presumably a "less than desirable" option given "hopefully" assignments also take into account competence. (Granted, that might be questioned in reality.)
It's interesting to note Republican Party Leadership tried to "primary" Murkowski and she ended up beating them. Leadership did manage to force a change in Republican candidate, but Murkowski beat that candidate in the General running as an Indie.
The key behind that was Alaska has ranked-choice voting. What happened was the Republican candidate got more votes than Murkowski in the first round, but the Democrat got less votes. So the Democrat was eliminated going into the second round, and Murkowski got most of the Democrat "second choice" (ranked choice) votes thus beating the Republican in the second round.
This is a good historical example of why ranked choice voting is a good idea. It creates pressure toward centrist candidates. Extremist candidates can come in first during the first round, but more moderate candidates who work to appeal across the aisle can pull votes from across the aisle in the later rounds.
In a strongly R district, the extremist R candidate has a likely chance of beating a moderate R in the Primary. That results in the extremist R very likely winning in the General.
In ranked choice, the extremist R would still get the majority of the R votes, but the moderate R who works to appeal across the aisle ends up getting D & I votes as D and I candidates get eliminated in the rounds. Or a moderate D candidate who works to appeal across the aisle could pull enough moderate R & I votes in later rounds to win.
This benefit of "working to appeal across the aisle" gives those politicians in power facing those types of elections leverage to convince their own parties that "ideological purity" will end up losing in the General. Rank choice voting also means party leadership cannot "primary" incumbents who don't demonstrate the leadership's idea of purity.